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CRIMINAL PROCEDURE
When AppealingIs Unappealing: A LookAt
The Constitutionality ofAnders Structures
By Daniel Blinka
Ellis T. McCoy
V.
Wisconsin Court of Appeals, District I
(Docket No. 87-5002)
ArguedJanuary 20, 1988
A controversial decisiori of the Warren Court may be
overturned or drastically rewritten by the Rehnquist Court,
but its demise will be mourned by few, if any. The case is
Anders v. California (386 U.S. 739 (1967)) which set forth a
procedure governing when an appointed attorney can with.
draw from representing an indigent defendant on an appeal
so lacking in merit that it is labeled frivolous.
Anders represents the egalitarian ideal of providing the
same level of legal representation for indigents as is available
for convicted defendants able to hire their own lawyer to
appeal their convictions. But the procedures it mandated
have proven unworkable.
ISSUE
McCoy presents the narrow, specialized question of
whether Wisconsin's version of the Anders procedure vio-
lates a defendant's constitutional right to counsel and due
process of law. Specifically, Wisconsin's statutory "discussion
rule" compels the defendant's attorney to not only identify
the appeal as frivolous, but to explain why any error that
might support an appeal is also frivolous.
McCoy, however, also presents the Supreme Court with
the opportunity to reconsider the entire Anders procedure,
which has been roundly and justly criticized by courts,
commentators and public defenders for the last twenty years.
FACIS
Ellis T. McCoy was convicted in Milwaukee County,
Wisconsin, for sexually assaulting and abducting a twelve
year-old girl. Louis Butler, an Assistant Wisconsin Public
Defender, was appointed to represent McCoy on appeal at
public expense. Butler reviewed the record of McCoy's trial
and concluded that any appeal would be frivolous; that is,
Butler found no'legal errors that even arguably held merit.
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Butler presented McCoy with three options. First, McCoy
could voluntarily dismiss his appeal and serve his twelve
years in prison. This would effectively preclude any further
appeals. Second, McCoy could fire Butler and act as his own
lawyer, filing his own brief attacking his conviction but
without the assistance of a lawyer. Third, he could request
that Butler file a "no merit report."
Under Wisconsin, law a no merit report is prepared by the
lawyer. It must state anything in the record that might even
arguably support an appeal, but must also include a discus-
sion by the lawyer explaining why the issue is frivolous and
not worthy of being pressed in a brief attacking the convic-
tion. This requirement is called the discussion rule; in effect
it compels a defendant's own lawyer to explain why the only
identifiable errors are frivolous. If the appellate court agrees
that the identified errors are frivolous, the conviction is
affirmed. McCoy opted for the no merit procedure, but
apparently agreed with Butler's decision to attack the legality
of the discussion rule.
After a series of legal maneuvers the constitutionality of
the rule was brought before the Wisconsin Supreme Court.
In a 4-to-3 decision, the court upheld the legality of the rule
(137 Wis. 2d 90 (1987)).
The majority recognized that the starting point for any
analysis was Anders-the Warren Court decision which
originated the no merit brief procedure. The Wisconsin
Supreme Court concluded that the discussion rule was
neither explicitly recognized in Anders nor precluded by it.
It justified the discussion rule as serving to assist clogged
courts in expeditiously sorting through frivolous matters as
well as ensuring that defense counsel actually thought
through the appeal and was effectively representing a defen-
dant in a futile cause. The court interpreted the discussion
rule as calling for only a brief summary of law and facts which
support the lawyer's conclusion-not a "protracted argu-
ment" in favor of it.
The dissenters contended that the discussion rule turns
the lawyer against his or her own client. They also remarked
on the drumbeat of criticism directed at Anders over the last
twenty years, observing that "practitioners find the Anders
procedure either unworkable or distasteful or both."
BACKGROUND AND SIGNIFICANCE
In Anders the Supreme Court recognized the special
problem posed by an appointed lawyer seeking to withdraw
from the rep'esentation of an indigent defendant on the
ground that any appeal would be frivolous. Anders is limited
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to indigent defendants who are attacking their convictions in
an initial appeal. Since the indigent defendant lacks the
economic resources to shop for another lawyer to bring the
appeal, certain procedures were throught necessary to en-
sure that any appeal was indeed frivolous. Counsel seeking
to withdraw must file a brief which refers to anything in the
record that might arguably support an appeal. The defendant
must be given a copy of the brief and the opportunity to
respond with any additional contentions. Finally, the appel-
late court must examine the briefs and the trial record and
independently conclude that the contentions are so utterly
without merit that they are frivolous. If the only identifiable
errors are frivolous, then the lawyer may withdraw and the
judgment of conviction is affirmed. If the errors are not
frivolous, they must be addressed on the merits.
The Anders procedure was intended to juggle the com-
peting and conflicting interests of the courts, the lawyer and
the indigent defendant. The defendant has a constitutional
right to effective assistance of counsel at trial and in litigating
a first appellate assault against the conviction (Pennsylvania
t. Finley 107 S.Ct. 1990 (1987); Preview, 1986-87 term, pp.
269-70). The lawyer, however, has an ethical responsibility
which precludes offering a frivolous argument to any court.
And the already congested appellate courts do not have the
resources to review full briefs and hear argument on issues
that are utterly without merit.
In addition to these considerations, Anders also repre-
sents the egalitarian ideal of the Warren Court. The case
appears to rest on the jaded assumption that there is a
difference in the representation provided by appointed
counsel, who represent the poor, and retained counsel, who
represent the economically advantaged. A convicted defen-
dant who is able to hire a lawyer has the financial means, so
the argument goes, to find some lawyer somewhere who will
brief his or her appeal regardless of the merits. But the
indigent is not free to shop for lawyers. If the indigent's
appointed lawyer says any appeal is frivolous, the indigent
defendant is not able to pick up the retainer check and see
another lawyer who may have a lower threshold of "frivolity."
If the indigent's lawyer refuses to press a frivolous appeal, the
alternatives are to withdraw the appeal (and serve the sen-
tence) or press the appeal without the assistance of any
lawyer. The Anders procedure was intended to provide a
third alternative, one which vainly attempted to redress the
conflicting interests of the lawyer who is obligated to zeal.
ously represent the client but also owes a fealty to the legal
system which forbids wafting just any argument before an
appellate court.
However laudable the motives underlying Anders; the
decision has few supporters and many fierce critics. Its
procedures have been called workable and distasteful by
courts and commentators. One seasoned public defender
wrote that it "is easier to simply file a frivolous brief at the
outset than to go through the frustrating and degrading
Andersprocedure." Anders has spawned diverse procedures
as state courts struggle to implement its protean resolution of
the irresolvable. The Wisconsin discussion rule is only one
such mutation, and it seems unlikely in light of this firestorm
of criticism that the Supreme Court is concerned simply with
this rule. Rather, it is this twenty year-old widespread dissatis-
faction with Anders itself that makes the decision ripe for
rethinking.
In particular, Anders raises a number of related problems.
First, what is a "frivolous" issue? How can a frivolous issue be
distinguished from an otherwise meritless or "loser" issue-
a distinction compelled but not explained by Anders? Sec-
ond, if counsel conscientiously concludes that any errors at
trial are not simply meritless but frivolous as well, then
Anders requires counsel to brief the unbriefable. That is, the
attorney must prepare a brief which refers to anything in the
record "that might arguably support an appeal." But if
counsel can execute this ratiocination, then why is the issue
frivolous? Third, how can labeling an appeal as frivolous be
reconciled with a lawyer's obligations toward his or her
client? Finally, if counsel decides to brief a frivolous issue out
of responsibility toward the client, has the lawyer violated
the ethical norms of the legal profession?
Wisconsin's discussion rule further complicates matters
by compelling defendant's counsel, who has already brand-
ed the appeal "frivolous," to explain why it is "utterly
without merit." McCoy argues that this rule deprives him of
legal assistance and sets his own lawyer at odds with his,
McCoy's, interests, The state of Wisconsin contends that
counsel's adversary obligation ended after he conscientious-
ly concluded that any appeal would be frivolous. In short,
any attempt to reconcile the discussion rule with Anderswill
founder because the decision itself unsuccessfully attempts
to reconcile conflicting interests.
ARGUMENTS
For Ellis T. McCoy (Counsel of Record, Louis B. Butler, Jr.,
819 N. Sixth Street, Room 821, Milvaukee, WI 53203; tele-
phone (414) 227-4891)
1. Wisconsin Rule 809.32(1) deprives McCoy of his rights to
appeal, to due process on appeal and to effective assis-
tance of counsel on appeal as it requires appellate coun-
sel to provide the court with reasons why a "no merit"
appeal lacks merit.
For the Wisconsin Court ofAppeals, Distrt (Counsel of
Record, DonaldJ Hanaivay, P. 0. Box 7857, Madison, WI
53 70 7-785 7, telephone (608) 2668908)
1. Wisconsin Rule 809.32(1) is consistent with require-
ments set forth in Anders and it does not deprive McCoy
of his rights to appeal, to due process on appeal or to
effective assistance of counsel on appeal as it requires
appellate counsel to provide the court with reasons why a
"no merit" appeal lacks merit.
AMICUS BRIEFS
In Support of Elis T. McCoy
The National Legal Aid and Defender Association, the
American Civil Liberties Union Foundation and the ACLU of
Wisconsin filed a joint brief
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